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eralism fails to recognize different ways of justifying liberal state. 
 
Key words: MacIntyre, liberalism, After Virtue, pluralism 
 
Mailing address: Faculty of Political Science, Lepušićeva 6,  
HR 10000 Zagreb. E-mail: ekulenovic@email.htnet.hr 
 
MacIntyre’s disquieting suggestion  
 In this paper I would like to explore Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of 
modern liberalism. My goal is to argue that his critique fails on two points. 
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First, it gives a wrong account of the liberal understanding of the self by 
characterising it as emotivist. Second, on the issue of moral consensus on 
principles of justice it puts in question only those versions of liberalism, 
which are derived from Enlightenment and founded on the belief that these 
issues can be resolved by appeal to universal norms derived from reason. If 
this belief proves to be wrong, it does not mean that the justification of lib-
eral institutions is not viable. I will claim that liberal pluralism as post-
Enlightenment theory – in the way it is defended by such authors as Isaiah 
Berlin, Joseph Raz and William Galston – avoids MacIntyre’s criticism and 
offers a convincing justification of the liberal state1.  
 The main point of MacIntyre’s criticism of contemporary liberalism is 
that it is unable to resolve moral conflicts in any kind of satisfactory way. As 
he puts it: “there seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in 
our culture” (MacIntyre, 1981:6). When it comes to issues such as the nature 
of just war, abortion or the just distribution of social goods there seems to be 
no rational method which would ensure a consensus between the conflicting 
views. The resolution of such conflicting arguments should come about by 
an appeal to impersonal and objective standards which could convince all 
rational moral agents. It should not come about by an appeal to personal and 
arbitrary will that does not rely on the strength of argument itself, but rather 
on rhetorical skill, charisma and manipulative power (MacIntyre, 1981:9). 
The goal of the Enlightenment thinkers was to supply us exactly with this 
kind of impersonal and objective standard: Kant through his idea of cate-
gorical imperative or Hume through his idea of moral sentiment, just to 
name two most influential representatives. However, this Enlightenment 
Project, as MacIntyre calls it, failed because “its protagonists had never suc-
ceeded in specifying a uniquely justifiable set of moral principles to which 
any fully rational agent whatsoever could not fail to assent” (MacIntyre, 
1981:271). The fact that it failed could suggest that so far we were just not 
lucky enough to have such a calibre of philosopher who would succeed in 
establishing moral standards universally acceptable to all rational persons. 
MacIntyre, however, goes one step further and claims that the project of es-
tablishing such moral standards was doomed to fail from day one. It does not 
matter if we talk about Kant’s idea of universal reason, Hume and his notion 
of moral sentiments or such post-Enlightenment thinkers as Moore and his 
theory of intuitions. What unites all of these thinkers is an understanding that  
 
1 Similar line of argument is pursued by both Barry (1991.) and Kurelić (2002.) with an 
important difference that Barry criticizes MacIntyre’s understanding of liberal neutrality, while 
Kurelić argues that MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism is one of "limited range" (Kurelić, 
2002.:134) by being applicable only to those liberals that deny that liberalism is a tradition. 
Although I agree with both of these authors, this article discusses MacInytre’s approach to 
liberalism on different grounds: that of liberal self and that of Enlightenment versus pluralist 
understanding of rationality. 
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“to be a moral agent is, on this view, precisely to be able to stand 
back from any and every situation in which one is involved, from any 
and every characteristic that one may posses, and to pass judgments 
on it from a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally 
detached from all social particularity” (MacIntyre, 1981:31-32).  
 MacIntyre claims that this understanding is based on an illusion because 
“morality which is no particular society’s morality is to be found nowhere” 
(MacIntyre, 1981:265-266). We will never be able to find coherent moral 
argument detached from any kind of social context and presented as a purely 
abstract principle. This illusion lead such great thinkers as Hume, Diderot 
and Kant to “claim universal rational authority for what is in fact the local 
morality” (MacIntyre, 1981:232).  
 So, the unavoidable failure of the Enlightenment project leads our 
contemporary culture into a moral cul-de-sac – emotivism. For an emotivist 
all moral judgments are nothing more then “expressions of preference” 
(MacIntyre, 1981:12). We are faced with a moral vacuum that “entails the 
obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-ma-
nipulative social relations” (MacIntyre, 1981:23). Emotivism understands all 
moral claims as being inevitably personal and arbitrary and all moral dis-
course as an “attempt of one will to align the attitudes, feelings, preferences 
and choices of another with its own” (MacIntyre, 1981:24). Through loss of 
social context from which different moral claims derived their authority we 
ended up with fragments of moral vocabulary used only to disguise alle-
giance to our own arbitrarily chosen moral code.  
 As liberalism is the most successful political child of the Enlightenment, 
MacIntyre suggest that if the Enlightenment project failed it follows that the 
liberal project failed too. Contemporary liberals are condemned either to 
deny the downfall of the Enlightenment project and try to convince everyone 
that there exists (or can exist) an impersonal universal standard by which we 
would evaluate competing moral claims, or to accept the emotivist view and 
use any means at their disposal – coercive power of the state, the mass me-
dia, academia – to manipulate others in joining their ranks. Behind the 
scenes of public moral debates in contemporary liberal societies we are 
faced with conceptual incommensurability of the rival arguments. What 
MacIntyre means by this is that we can present logically valid moral claims 
– logically valid in a sense that conclusion does indeed follow from the 
premises (MacIntyre, 1981:10) – while holding conflicting premises that re-
flect competing goals and ends. When it comes to question of ends, most of 
us behave like emotivists for we take a view that “questions of ends are 
questions of values, and on values reason is silent; conflict between rival 
values cannot be rationally settled” (MacIntyre, 1981:26). It follows that the 
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choice between different ends is never rational, but completely contingent 
and arbitrary.  
 If the choice is arbitrary or rational depends, I would claim, on our 
understanding of rationality. Here it would be useful to introduce Isaiah 
Berlin’s distinction between monist and pluralist understanding of rationality 
(Berlin,1990:5). Two essential and interconnected elements of monist ra-
tionality are: 1) universal and eternal moral principles – belief that that justi-
fication of all valid moral claims is outside the realm of empirical, for true 
moral claims are abstract, timeless and universal and therefore they are not 
dependant on particular social circumstances; 2) the unity of moral claims – 
all of these claims are in mutual harmony or otherwise in hierarchical order 
which clearly dictates, in case of conflict, which of them should have prior-
ity. This understanding of rationality underlines the thought of most of the 
Enlightenment thinkers (especially Kant who can be seen as quintessential 
philosopher of the Enlightenment era).  
 Opposed to monism there is a pluralist understanding of rationality 
which suggests quite the opposite: 1) valid moral claims are not derived 
from a priori abstract principles, but can only have meaning in specific so-
cial context; 2) there are equally valid and sound moral claims who are in di-
rect conflict with each other or even mutually exclusive. This might suggest 
that there is no difference between the pluralist understanding of rationality 
and relativism. This is why we have to expand the pluralist definition of ra-
tionality and say that a moral claim can be considered rational only if it is 
both logically coherent and empirically sound. All of these four points coin-
cide with MacIntyre’s understanding of basic rationality, but let me for now 
concentrate on the last two. When talking about Aristotle’s practical syllo-
gism (if X then B) he concludes that logical validity is a “necessary condi-
tion for intelligible human action” and “must hold for any recognizable hu-
man culture” (MacIntyre, 1981:161). In Whose Justice? Which rationality? 
he again agrees with Aristotle’s claim that “no one who understands the laws 
of logic can remain rational while rejecting them” (MacIntyre, 1988:4). As 
far as the argument that any moral claim (although not only moral, but any 
kind of claim) considered to be rational has to correspond to our empirical 
experience, MacIntyre confirms this when he says how “in the domain of 
fact there are procedures for eliminating disagreement” (MacIntyre, 
1981:32). Obviously these two last points give only a very limited concept 
of rationality – because they have to accommodate many different and often 
conflicting metaphysical, teleological and moral world views which we do 
indeed consider to be rational. This excludes the relativist idea of “anything 
goes” and recognizes as irrational not just those who claim that the Earth is 
flat and is positioned on the back of a colossal turtle, but, more importantly, 
the moral claims of groups such as Nazis and religious fundamentalists. 
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 The objection, though, still stands – how can I show that liberal pluralists 
differ in significantly way from emotivists? Or to use MacIntyre’s own 
words – how can I prove that moral pluralism leads to “an ordered dialogue 
of intersected view points” and not “to an unharmonious melange of ill-as-
sorted fragments” (MacIntyre, 1981:10)? If we take pluralist arguments 1) 
and 2) about rationality into account it follows that we can not expect to 
reach a consensus by an appeal to impartial and neutral standard, for there 
can never be such a standard. However, it does not follow from this that we 
are condemned to accept emotivism as the only intelligible position. Political 
theorists such as Berlin and Galston suggest that there might be another op-
tion available – that of liberal pluralism. If monist understanding of rational-
ity is wrong and we are bound to find ourselves faced with conflicting but 
equally valid and sound moral claims, it would be inconsistent to believe 
that the only rational outcome would be to establish a moral claim that 
would override all others. Pluralist approach to rationality assumes that a 
proper goal of rational enquiry in ethics or political theory is not to provide 
“timeless, objective and universal truths” (MacInytre, 1990: 65) and ensure 
their legitimacy by branding them as rational, but to investigate arguments 
from all the sides in the conflict and informs us what are we gaining and 
what are we losing by endorsing one of these sides. Therefore, if we want to 
rationally justify our moral claims to others we have to accept that the only 
way to accommodate conflicting claims is to: 1) try and reach a compromise 
between them or, when that is not possible, accept the fact of tragic choice; 
2) ensure a realm of private sphere where each individual can achieve his 
understanding of good. It is to this last point that I turn to now.  
 
Good life for man and plurality of values 
 For MacIntyre western moral tradition started going downhill since 
Enlightenment thinkers neglected the first question of moral philosophy – 
that of human telos, or to put it more precisely, the question of what is a 
good life for man. He introduced the following teleological scheme: we are 
faced with a man-as-he-happens-to-be and are trying to establish the picture 
of a man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos. Rational “ethics is the sci-
ence which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition 
from the former state to the latter” (MacIntyre, 1981:52). When the philoso-
phers of the Enlightenment project rejected the teleological view of human 
nature and substituted it with universal moral rules, what they did was to 
erase the latter element in the scheme and by this made rational ethics un-
intelligible. 
 It was the abandonment of Aristotelian cosmology that lead the 
Enlightenment philosophers to put the question of human telos aside (al-
though, as MacIntyre himself suggests, not completely aside – for Kant and 
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Diderot both included teleological elements in their moral philosophy (Mac-
Intyre, 1981:55-57)). This abandonment brought with it the realization that 
there is not only one universal human telos worth pursuing, as there are 
many valuable goals one can strive for and many ways in which a man can 
achieve a good life. What’s more, some of these goals and ways of life are 
mutually exclusive and it was up to each individual person himself to make a 
choice between them – not the state, the church or some wise philosopher 
king. This is where both the Enlightenment and contemporary pluralist liber-
als agree – that one of the main tasks of liberal state is to ensure a private 
realm for each individual to be able to pursue his own conception of good 
life without interference from others.  
 It might come as a bit of a surprise that MacIntyre himself agrees with 
the existence of plurality of good lives men can pursue. For him practice of 
virtues is the means through which one achieves his telos, but considering 
there is more then one rational and worthwhile telos, there will also be more 
the one list of virtues. MacInytre is at his best when he explains the differ-
ence between Homeric, Aristotelian, the New Testament’s, Ben Franklin’s 
and Jane Austen’s list of virtues. Not only are there different lists of virtues, 
often mutually exclusive – such as Aristotle’s virtue of magnanimity and 
Christian virtue of humility – but there are also “different theories about 
what virtue is” (MacIntyre, 1981:183). MacIntyre does try to avoid this last 
problem and goes at great lengths to establish a single core concept of virtue 
by differentiating between external and internal goods to practices and con-
structing a scheme made of practices, narrative and, finally, moral tradition. 
This scheme certainly deserves more space, for it represents the core of 
MacIntyre’s own theory of virtues, but as far as his criticism of liberalism 
goes, it does not add anything new. It can help us understand why MacInytre 
favours virtues advocated by Jane Austen rather then those advocated by 
Benjamin Franklin – but this is only because he believes there can be a sin-
gle understanding of what virtue is, not because there should be a only single 
list of virtues or only one good life for man. 
 That MacIntyre is a pluralist when it comes to different ways of under-
standing one’s telos is obvious from his critique of Aristotle. He says of Ar-
istotle that he had “too simple and too unified a view of complexities of hu-
man good” (MacIntyre, 1981:157). I want to suggest that it was exactly be-
cause Aristotle had a single ideal of good life of man – that of “great-souled 
man” that he could be consistent in prescribing his list of virtues as univer-
sally valid. If the life of a philosopher or a citizen is to be praised above all 
others, then it comes as no surprise that one should obtain those virtues that 
are essential for leading a contemplative or a political life. For Aristotle the 
answer to the question “what sort of person am I to become?” can have only 
one answer, hence, “there exists a cosmic order which dictates the place of 
each virtue in a total harmonious scheme of human life” (MacIntyre, 1981: 
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142). However, we can conclude about Aristotle here the same thing that 
MacInytre concluded about Hume, Diderot and Kant: that he claims “univer-
sal rational authority for what is in fact the local morality” (MacIntyre, 
1981:232). The crucial difference is that unlike the Enlightenment philoso-
phers, Aristotle made this claim on the issue of the good life for man. 
 This leads us back to the question of the difference between liberal and 
emotivist understanding of the self. MacIntyre himself never makes this dis-
tinction, which is probably the weakest point of his criticism of contempo-
rary liberal societies. As far as emotivist self goes, MacIntyre describes him 
very vividly as 
“lacking any ultimate criteria… that whatever criteria or principle the 
emotivist self may profess, they are to be constructed as expressions 
of attitudes, preferences and choices which are themselves not gov-
erned by criterion, principle of value… from this it follows that the 
emotivist self can have no rational history in its transition from one 
state of moral commitment to another” (MacIntyre, 1981:33).  
 This description brings into mind Nietzsche’s Übermensch or one of Sar-
tre’s existentialist characters, but has little connection to the liberal under-
standing of the self. There are indeed people who go around re-inventing 
themselves without being able to give any valid reason – one day religious, 
next day agnostic, one day cosmopolitan, next day nationalist. However, we 
would hardly think of these people as personifying the liberal ideal of self. In 
fact, this Sartrean/Nietzschean individual would be easier to find in the 
pages of existentialist novels, than walking the streets of liberal society. It 
should not come us a surprise that there are not many (if any) consistent lib-
eral thinkers who think of Nietzsche or Sartre as their heroes.  
 When MacInyre talks about “the modern self with its criterionless 
choices” (MacIntyre, 1981:202) it is a far cry from what liberals think when 
they talk about modern self. First, liberals would disagree with MacIntyre 
that it is Sartre’s theory of the self “which captures so well the spirit of mod-
ernity” (MacIntyre, 1981:214). As I have pointed out earlier, what liberals 
deny is that there is only one valid telos men should pursue, not that there 
are no valid goals which we should try to accomplish or that these goals 
should be creations of our will completely detached from any kind of social 
context. When MacIntyre says that we are not isolated individuals and that 
our lives have a “moral starting point” (MacIntyre, 1981:220), his thought is 
strikingly similar to that of John Rawls when he says in A Theory of Justice 
that “in drawing up our plan of life we do not start de novo” (John Rawls, 
1971:563), but rely on existing cultural forms. Also, in liberal societies vir-
tues still play a large role in people’s lives, even if they do not refer to them 
as virtues. This is a point that William Galston makes in his criticism of 
MacIntyre in Liberal Purposes: “the virtues are by no means dead in liberal 
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society. Courage, justice, self-restraint, prudence, and many others are 
widely prized… that they are more prized than practiced is not a problem 
confined to our own historical moment” (Galston, 1991:71).  
 Why then does MacIntyre think that liberals have a notion of the self 
completely cut off from its social embodiments? It seems that he makes a 
mistake by failing to differentiate between Nietzsche’s understanding of in-
dividuality through self-assertion and the liberal understanding of individu-
ality through reflection and autonomy. Nietzsche’s vision of Übermensch is 
that of a “man who transcends, finds his good nowhere in social world… 
only in that which him himself dictates” (MacIntyre, 1981:257). This might 
lead us to think that Nitzschean super-man fulfils the Kantian requirement of 
autonomy, which dictates that person is autonomous only when he acts 
based on self-prescribed and universal moral imperative. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. The core idea of Kant’s moral philosophy was to 
show that as moral agents we are able to establish universal moral rules that 
would be the same for all rational persons irrespectively of the time and 
place. However, to be truly moral it is not enough only to follow these moral 
rules out of a fear of punishment or prospect of gain, we have to genuinely 
will to do what is morally right. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, this idea 
was absurd, for there are no such universal moral rules. His “genuine in-
sight”, as MacInytre calls it, was to see that “what purported to be appeals to 
objectivity were in fact expressions of subjective will” (MacIntyre, 
1981:113). Concluding that there are no universally valid moral imperatives, 
Nietzsche deleted the distinction between arbitrary will and rational argu-
ment. 
 If Kant failed in his moral philosophy (and not only Nietzsche and 
MacIntyre, but also most contemporary liberals and of liberal pluralists be-
lieve he did) it does not mean that we are left only with the emotivist notion 
of autonomy understood as self-assertion through arbitrariness of one’s will. 
As Joseph Raz puts it: the understanding of autonomy that requires “a per-
fect existentialist with no fixed biological or social nature who creates him-
self as he goes along” is “an incoherent dream” (Raz, 1986:155). The same 
line of thought can be found in Caney’s argument in which he states that lib-
erals do not foster an atomistic understanding of the self which would define 
moral vocabulary outside any social context and he backs up this claim with 
quotations from leading liberal philosophers such as J.S. Mill, T.H. Green, 
Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls (Caney, 1992). 
 This misinterpretation of liberal self leads MacIntyre to give a distorted 
picture of liberal expectations of acceptable behaviour in public realm. In 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? he argues that in “public realms of the 
market and of liberal individualist politics… that people in general have 
such and such preferences is held to provide by itself a sufficient reason for 
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acting so as to satisfy them” (MacIntyre, 1988:339). Anyone who, involved 
in the debate on a socially controversial issue (abortion, gay marriages, 
euthanasia, etc.), opts for arguing her case by stating “that’s my preference” 
and refusing to offer any further justification of valid reasons for advocating 
her position, would not be taken seriously and would, quite rightly, quickly 
be disqualified from participating in the public debate. Dedicated Nietzsche-
an could argue that offering arguments and rational justifications for one’s 
moral position is anyway nothing more than masking of our personal prefer-
ences under a cloak of general principles. However, that is an argument no 
true liberal would ascribe to, a fact that in itself proves an important differ-
ence between the ideal of liberal self and emotivist self. 
 The reason why liberals insist on individualism and autonomy is not be-
cause they have Sartrean or Nietzschean understanding of the self, but be-
cause they think it is important for every person to have a chance to criticize 
and even leave one’s own moral community. This is something that MacIn-
tyre also finds important for although “one has to find its moral identity in 
and through its membership in communities” this “does not entail that the 
self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of 
community” (MacIntyre, 1981:221). He continues by saying that one can not 
question her moral community by escaping to “a realm of entirely universal 
maxims which belong to man as such” (MacIntyre, 1981:221). He obviously 
thinks of Kant here, but fails to see that post-Enlightenment liberals com-
pletely agree with him on this point. Autonomy and reflection for them do 
not mean that we have to or even can transcendent any given social context 
but that we are able to use moral arguments already supplied by our own 
moral tradition (internal consistency) or by a different moral tradition to 
question our own cultural forms (external criticism). As moral agents we are 
able to break away from the limits of our own social context and the dogmas 
of our own moral community through critical insight. It is the ability Vico 
called entrare and Herder called Einfühlen, an ability which Mill thought 
Bentham lacked and which Michael Ignatieff thought Berlin possessed more 
than any other liberal philosopher of his age. It is through this kind of critical 
insight and power of reflection that we are able to conclude that there was a 
value in the telos of warrior’s life in ancient heroic societies, while there is 
no value in the telos of life of a gang member in today’s LA, although there 
is little difference in their core virtues – loyalty to one’s kin or fellow gang 
member, destruction of one’s enemies.  
 This brings us to one more important point: although liberals argue that 
there are numerous incompatible ways of life worth pursuing, this does not 
mean that in liberal societies there is no rational consensus on ways of life 
that have little or no value at all – such as that of a compulsive gambler, 
skinhead thug or drug addict. This idea was pointed out clearly by John Gray 
when he said in his essay “Toleration: a post-liberal perspective” how it is 
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not possible to say which is the better conception of good – one embodied in 
the Samaritan life of Mother Theresa or one embodied in the dandyish life of 
Oscar Wilde, but we can still say that the life of a crack addict is bad (Gray, 
1997:29). If liberals sometimes seem reluctant to criticize and condemn 
these kinds of lifestyles it is only because they have a well-founded fear of 
the possibility that some social group might abuse the power of the state to 
impose their own conception of good life to everybody else in the political 
community. 
 
Justice and Conflict  
 MacIntyre’s criticism of liberalism does not only deal with the under-
standing of modern self, but also with the inability of liberalism to give a ra-
tional and universally acceptable account of the principles of justice. Indeed, 
we find conflicting moral claims not only on the issue of good life for man, 
but also on issues that directly affect the lives of all members of political 
community. It is on this second issue that liberal pluralists differ substan-
tially from Kantian liberals, who are convinced that it is possible to establish 
neutral principles of justice which could be accepted by people with differ-
ent and even opposing conceptions of good life and which would not favour 
any one conception of good above all others. This is exactly what Rawls 
tried to achieve in his A Theory of Justice and what Dworkin meant by neu-
trality of the state. However, if all moral claims are inevitably tied to a spe-
cific moral tradition and there is no, to use Thomas Nagle’s phrase, “view 
from nowhere” then what follows is that in resolving a conflict between two 
competing values best we can do is take both of them into account and hope 
to achieve a compromise between them. When that is not possible we will 
have to accept the sacrificing one of these values for the benefit of the other. 
This is why Berlin (“an arch-liberal” as Galston rightly notices (Galston, 
1991: 72)) says that “if, as I believe, the ends of men are many and not all of 
them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of con-
flict – and of tragedy – can never wholly be eliminated from human life, ei-
ther personal or social” (Berlin, 1969:169).  
 MacIntyre discusses the issue of distributive justice and rightly concludes 
that neither Rawls’ egalitarian argument nor Nozick’s libertarian argument 
can give us a decisive answer. Rawls suggests that material goods in a just 
society should be distributed on the principle of need and that one’s talents 
should play no part in the distributive scheme, as we were in no way instru-
mental in acquiring them. Nozick argues that we should be guided by the 
principle of entitlement and that considering we own our talents we are enti-
tled to any goods that we obtained through the use of these talents. If we take 
that both of these lines of argument are logically coherent, we have to accept 
that they are incommensurable – there is no overriding principle which could 
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help us decide between Rawls or Nozick. MacIntyre says that this is because 
“our pluralist culture possesses no method of weighing, no rational criterion 
for deciding between claims based on legitimate entitlement against claims 
based on need” (MacIntyre, 1981:246).  
 Liberal pluralists suggest that we do possess a rational criterion – we take 
them both to be legitimate and valid, but because of the moral complexity of 
the world not all valid principles go hand in hand. We just have to accept 
that there are no easy answers. However, in most cases compromise can still 
be achieved. This is what Berlin suggests:  
“What is to be done? How do we choose between possibilities? What 
and how much do we sacrifice to what? There is, it seems to me, no 
clear reply. But collisions, even if they cannot be avoided, can be 
softened. Claims can be balanced, compromises can be reached…” 
(Berlin, 1990:17).  
 This kind of pluralist approach does not only apply to the subject of dis-
tributive justice. MacInytre talks about the Bakke case, in which the US Su-
preme Court had to make a decision on the discriminatory policy of the af-
firmative action that kept better qualified white students from entering top 
medical schools. MacInytre’s complaint is that the Supreme Court had to 
make a compromise between two conflicting claims because it could not in-
voke our “shared moral first principles” considering that “our society as a 
whole has none” (MacInytre, 1981:253). From a pluralist point of view, we 
might not have shared moral first principles but that does not mean we can-
not find other people’s moral principles intelligible and equally rational. In 
the Bakke case both the principle of admitting most qualified candidates to 
medical schools and the principle of the positive discrimination of the mem-
bers of previously underprivileged group seem to be intelligible and rational. 
It is a fact of our complex moral world that they are not compatible. There-
fore, choosing one while completely disregarding the other does seem less 
just then trying to take both principles into account and achieving a com-
promise. 
 As I mentioned earlier, there will be cases where a compromise between 
two rational but conflicting claims is not possible. Here we are faced with 
what Berlin called a tragic choice – we are forced to sacrifice one important 
good for the sake of another. Abortion seems to be one such case: either we 
side with the woman’s right to choose or with the embryo’s right to live. 
Even in this case it makes a difference how we treat the other side in the de-
bate – do we accuse them of violating basic human rights and, as Rawls did 
in Political Liberalism (Rawls, 1993:243-244), call them unreasonable or do 
we acknowledge that their argument is valid and should be taken seriously. 
As Galston observes: “the anguished tone of recent public debate [on abor-
tion] testifies to the widespread recognition that every course of action nec-
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essarily surrenders some significant good” (Galston, 1991: 73). Compromise 
still might not be possible and we will be faced with loosing a certain social 
good while achieving another. We would, however, avoid declaring societies 
such as Ireland unjust (or the other way around, from the Catholic point of 
view) and we might define our public policies quite differently. For exam-
ple, Switzerland does not ban abortion, but does require of pregnant women 
thinking about abortion to go through counselling where other options (such 
as adoption) are presented to them. 
 
Conclusion 
 Given all that was said we can see why MacIntyre has little sympathy for 
Kant, authors of the Ninth Edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica or early 
Rawls, Dworkin or Gewirth but it is surprising that he is so hostile to con-
temporary liberalism as such. As I have suggested, there is no real truth in 
his claim that liberals have a sort of Sartrean or Nietzschean emotivist un-
derstanding of the self. When MacIntyre praises Vico because he was the 
first to stress  
“the importance of the undeniable fact… that the subject matters of 
moral philosophy at least… are nowhere to be found except as em-
bodied in the historical lives of particular social groups and so pos-
sessing the distinctive characteristics of historical existence” 
(MacInytre, 1981:265)  
 He neglects to acknowledge that one of Berlin’s main heroes was Vico 
and that it was the acceptance of Vico’s argument that lead Berlin to leave 
analytical philosophy for the history of ideas. When MacIntyre gives us his 
account of the good life “the life spent in seeking for the good life for man” 
(MacInytre, 1981:219) it would not be far fetched to imagine that the same 
sentence could have been written by liberal pluralist philosopher such as Jo-
seph Raz.  
 The same can be said about MacInytre’s claim that “the notion of the po-
litical community as a common project is alien to the modern liberal indi-
vidualist world” (MacInytre, 1981:156). This is of course true if we think of 
a common project as an Aristotelian polis where there is only way of life – 
that of “great-souled man” – worth pursuing and, hence, good community is 
the one that promotes this way of life. Given that the pluralist argument 
about incommensurability of competing ways of life, conflicting values and 
principles of justice is correct, this kind of common project would be not 
only absurd, but also dangerous. MacIntyre in his discussion of Sophocles’ 
tragedies reveals that he find this pluralist argument to be correct. Plato and 
Aristotle might be wrong in their monist understanding of the good life for 
man and its corresponding virtues, but their conclusion that moral conflict, 
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either in personal or public life, is the greatest evil and that every conflict is 
“a result either of flaws of character in individuals or of unintelligent politi-
cal arrangements” is consistent with their starting premises (MacInytre, 
1981:157). MacIntyre is less consistent when he says it is “through conflict 
and sometimes only through conflict that we learn what our ends and pur-
poses are” (MacInytre, 1981:164) and that “traditions, when vital, embody 
continuities of conflict” (MacInytre, 1981:223), but still maintains that mod-
ern politics is “civil war carried on by other means” (MacInytre, 1981:253). 
We do not need to go deep into the analysis of the character of different 
types of conflict to see that there is an obvious difference between coopera-
tive disagreement (to use MacItyre’s own phrase from his essay “Tolerations 
and the Goods of Conflict” (MacInytre, 1999:134-135)) of conflicting views 
and going out to the street and bashing the head of everyone who disagrees 
with us.  
 In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry MacIntyre maintains that “it 
was a tenet of Enlightenment cultures that every point of view, whatever its 
source, could be brought into rational debate with every other, this tenet had 
as its counterpart a belief that such rational debate could always, if ade-
quately conducted, have a conclusive outcome” and therefore “what would 
be required… for a conclusive termination of rational debate would be ap-
peal to a standard or set of standards such that no adequately rational person 
could fail to acknowledge its authority” (MacInytre, 1990: 172). Although 
he correctly recognizes the authors of the Ninth Edition of Encyclopaedia 
Britannica as late 19th century advocates of Enlightenment cultures, he also 
acknowledge that “nobody now shares the standpoint of the Ninth Edition” 
(MacInytre, 1990: 170) (except that its “ghosts still haunt the contemporary 
academia”). It would be fair to assume that contemporary liberal thinkers 
and liberal institutions do not rely on standpoints that nobody shares, but 
rather that they evolve from Enlightenment mould to a more pluralist one. In 
that sense, liberalism shows the same ability of redefining itself as a tradition 
that MacInytre ascribes to Thomism: “Aquinas strategy… was to enable Au-
gustinians to understand how, by their own standards, they confronted prob-
lems for the adequate treatment of which, so long as they remained within 
the confines of their own system, they lacked the necessary resources” 
(MacInytre, 1990: 173). One needs only to substitute Aquinas with pluralists 
and Augustinians with Enlightenment liberals.  
 Similarly, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? he argues that in liberal 
societies “no overall theory of the human good is to be regarded as justified” 
which leads a debate on social justice to be “necessarily barren” (MacIntyre, 
1988.: 343). Accusing pluralist liberals of not being able to produce an over-
all theory of the human good is like accusing impressionist painter of using 
visible brush strokes. For post-Enlightenment liberals would not agree that 
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no theory of human good is to be regarded as justified, but rather that many 
of them (although not any of them) can be justified.  
 Further, a plurality of conflicting or incompatible theories of human good 
does not inevitably result in inability to reach any level of consensus in 
modern liberal societies. Here I would side with Galston’s claim that Mac-
Intyre is “oblivious to the underlying agreement in [liberal] societies, an 
agreement that permits most conflict to be waged and resolved peaceably” 
(Galston, 1991:75). For when MacIntyre argues that “our society cannot 
hope to achieve moral consensus” (MacInytre, 1981:253) or condemns “plu-
ralist political rhetoric whose function is to conceal the depth of our con-
flicts” (MacInytre, 1981:253) or argues that “debate on human good in gen-
eral is… necessarily barren of substantive agreed conclusions in liberal so-
cial order” (MacIntyre,1988.: 343), he fails to take into account that in the 
last decades it was the liberal pluralists who were the most vocal in empha-
sizing the importance of moral and political conflict in modern societies, 
while at the same time insisting on preserving an existing consensus on basic 
human rights.  
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